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Dealing With the Devil in Darfur
Dealing With the Devil in Darfur
Beirut, Lebanon
AS the peace talks for the Darfur region of Sudan drew to a close
last month, the United States took over the task of defining the
solution. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick flew into Abuja,
Nigeria, where the talks were being held, on May 2 and three days later
the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed. The only trouble is, the United
States is backing the most abusive rebel leader in Darfur.
The response to the peace agreement was tepid in Abuja. But it was
far cooler in Darfur, where the agreement is widely viewed as a peace
between two criminal elements: the Sudanese government and Minni Arcua
Minnawi, the leader of the faction of the Sudan Liberation Army that is
drawn mainly from the Zaghawa tribe.
Mr. Minnawi's group is one of three rebel groups in Darfur — the two
others rejected the agreement — where the Zaghawas make up less than 8
percent of the population. The wealth and influence they have gained
because of their energy, drive and capacity for strategic action have
caused tensions with other tribes for years.
But since the rebellion began, the abusive behavior of Mr. Minnawi's
forces — often hundreds of miles outside their home area — has awakened
old fears that the tribe has a hidden agenda: the creation of a new
Zaghawa homeland carved out of the more fertile lands of others. Mr.
Minnawi's acceptance of the peace agreement is reason enough for most
Darfurians to reject it.
The tragedy of the people's rejection is that the agreement has some
virtue. There is, for the first time, a timetable for the disarmament
of the janjaweed, the Arab militias that with government backing are
destroying everything that makes life possible in Darfur. In three
years' time, Darfurians will have elections to choose their own
representatives. Until then, a nominee of the rebel movements will
occupy the fourth-highest position in the presidency and will control a
new regional authority with a first-year budget for security,
resettlement, reconstruction and development of more than a
half-billion dollars.
But the agreement also has a number of critical weaknesses. Most
important, it is excessively reliant on the cooperation of a government
that has not honored a single commitment made since it unleashed its
forces against the rebels, and the marginalized tribes from which they
are drawn, early in 2003.
In addition, Mr. Minnawi's behavior in the month since he signed the
agreement has not been promising. In peace as in war, Mr. Minnawi is
wedded to force. On May 20, his men seized one of his most visible
critics, Suliman Gamous. Mr. Gamous has been held in solitary, without
charge, ever since. As humanitarian coordinator of the Sudan Liberation
Army, Mr. Gamous made it possible for the United Nations and many
nongovernmental groups to work in rebel areas. He helped hundreds of
foreign journalists move safely around Darfur and document the plight
of its people.
But Mr. Minnawi denied senior United Nations officials access to
Mr. Gamous for nearly a month. When concerned Zaghawas sought a meeting
to ask why Mr. Gamous had been arrested, Mr. Minnawi's chief of staff
told them, "I can shoot Gamous and sodomize you." They were stripped,
bound, pistol-whipped and burned with cigarettes.
African Union officials have verified the events and have rebutted
Mr. Minnawi's claim that Chadian mercenaries were the perpetrators. But
nobody involved in the peace plan has criticized him publicly. Once
again, his abuses have been passed over in silence.
If the Darfur Peace Agreement is to have any hope of succeeding, the
United States must stop empowering criminals and antagonizing those who
are unconvinced. Rather, the peace brokers should assist rebel
commanders critical of Mr. Minnawi to convene a conference and elect a
leadership that would cross tribal lines and have popular support.
Darfurians must be convinced that this peace is their peace and not, as
many call it, the "Ila Digen peace," the peace of Mr. Minnawi's small
clan.
The United States must increase confidence in the peace agreement by
fiercely rebuking the Khartoum government — and Mr. Minnawi — for every
violation of the agreement and every deadline they fail to meet. All
Darfur's tribes must be brought into the peace process — most
important, the Arab tribes that had no place at the Abuja table, even
though the vast majority of them did not join the janjaweed. And no
regional dialogue would be complete without the involvement of the
janjaweed themselves, who despite their atrocities are one of the keys
to a lasting settlement.
Last, the United States must make clear that there is no peace
without justice. It must provide the International Criminal Court with
intelligence on the conflict to ensure that nobody, government official
or rebel, gets away with murder in Darfur. A first step would be to
distance itself from its new favorite son. Minni Minnawi is not the
guarantor of peace; he is one of the obstacles to it.
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